Speech by Singapore President SR Nathan at the MFA's Diplomatic Academy's inaugural S Rajaratnam Lecture on 10 March 2008, Island Ballroom, Shangri-La Hotel

Deputy Prime Minister
Ministers
Excellencies
Distinguished Guests
Ladies and Gentlemen

Singapore's Foreign Policy: Beginnings and Future

Opening Remarks

1 Thank you for giving me the privilege to deliver the inaugural S Rajaratnam Lecture before such a distinguished audience and to launch the MFA Diplomatic Academy.

2 Every one present must be aware that our independence came suddenly. We had no previous diplomatic experience or the institutional memory with which to engage in diplomacy. It was against those circumstances that our foreign policy had to be developed on the run, so to speak. It fell on Mr Rajaratnam, our first and longest serving Foreign Minister, to secure for our nation the international recognition and good ties with other nations that we needed for our survival. Over the course of two decades he shaped our foreign policy with a steady hand.

3 This occasion brings back many memories for me of the Foreign Ministry that I entered in December 1965, as a young and ill-prepared civil servant. The late Professor Michael Leifer labelled us "a collection of information gatherers and messenger boys". This was not inaccurate. Given the circumstances of our independence, we really floundered - learning diplomatic practices on the job and struggling to learn about diplomacy through practical exposure. This applied to both the political leaders and officers. Fortunately, our political leaders of the time were men who had been touched by world politics, especially the independence struggles in Asia and Africa, and the aspirations of Afro-Asian leaders and peoples contending with colonial and big power domination.

4 But we survived our mistakes and improvisations. Over the years, my colleagues developed skills and knowledge to make our diplomatic service what it is today. Looking back, it has turned out to be a great enterprise made famous, despite our smallness, by many distinguished colleagues like Professor Tommy Koh, DPM Professor S Jayakumar and many others. Among them were colleagues like the late Dr Wong Lin Ken, Chi Owyang, Ko Teck Kin, Ho Rih Hwa, Tan Siak Kew, Lien Ying Chow and P S Raman. We still have with us Lee Khoon Choy and Maurice Baker who, together with those no longer with us, were our founding ambassadors. They took on their diplomatic roles without any prior experience and made personal sacrifices not only of their own careers but those of their wives, many of whom left their jobs without any financial compensation, to accompany their husbands abroad. Today we have other distinguished diplomats like Chan Heng Chee, Chin Siat-Yoon, Edward Lee, Chew Tai Soo, K Kesavapany, Kishore Mahbubani Tony Siddique, and Ong Keng Yong. They have all left their mark on our diplomatic history. Above all, there was our pioneer diplomat Ridzwan Dzafir, who was the first to set up and serve in our diplomatic mission in Kuala Lumpur immediately after independence, and later in Jakarta. He distinguished himself in both assignments.

5 In those early years, Singapore had to resort to the appointment of distinguished private individuals - not career diplomats; for we had none - to head our key diplomatic missions. Despite their lack of diplomatic experience, they took to their tasks and fulfilled them admirably, often under trying circumstances. Although I have mentioned several of them earlier, I am afraid it will only be possible to highlight four of them and their achievements.

Founding Ambassadors

6 The late Mr Lien Ying Chow was called upon to head our Kuala Lumpur Mission after our first High Commissioner Mr Ko Teck Kin fell ill. Mr Lien took over after Mr Ko passed away, just seven months after being appointed to the post. Our relations following Separation were tense. Mr Lien stayed above the fray and used his close friendship with the late Tunku Abdul Rahman to ride out the difficulties. His quiet diplomacy defused misunderstandings and cooled temperatures on both sides. He knew nothing of diplomacy but practised it skilfully to achieve his objective of preserving and consolidating our relations.

7 Second, the late Mr Chi Owyang, who had the distinction of being Singapore's longest serving ambassador in a single country. At the age of 74, he started a new career as our Ambassador to the Kingdom of Thailand. He too knew nothing of diplomacy but accepted the appointment out of a sense of duty. His access to the Palace in Bangkok was legendary. His friendship with succeeding generations of Thai leaders and the respect that Thai officials accorded him, gave him access which other diplomats could only dream of. He used all those qualities and his humility to strengthen Singapore's relations with Thailand.

8 Next, the late Mr P S Raman, who assumed his post as our first Ambassador to Indonesia in 1968, in the aftermath of the Konfrontasi period. He provided calm and unwavering leadership in the tense atmosphere following the sacking of the Singapore Embassy by rioters in October 1968. His unflappable spirit stood him well as he engaged his host ministers and officials during a period of tension and anger at all levels in Jakarta. He persevered with developing bilateral relations until he had a heart attack and had to be brought back to Singapore. Thereafter, he served successfully as our High Commissioner in Canberra and later Ambassador in Moscow, where he succumbed to a massive heart attack.

9 Finally, Professor Maurice Baker, an academic at the University of Singapore before he became Singapore's High Commissioner to India in 1967. Professor Baker readily responded to the call of duty. He subsequently served as Singapore's High Commissioner to Malaysia and later Ambassador to the Philippines. His ability to inspire trust in people earned him acceptance and respect, as well as esteem and recognition for his country. In 1988, Malaysia conferred on him the Panglima Setia Mahkota (PSM), carrying the title of "Tan Sri", a rare Malaysian distinction for a Singapore diplomat.

10 Our founding ambassadors may have lacked formal diplomatic training but all had qualities which helped them fulfil important missions critical to bilateral relations and Singapore's well-being. Such occasions will arise again. It is indeed healthy to have a leavening of non-career officials to provide alternative views and to bring alternative perspectives to our diplomacy.

11 I am happy that Singapore's career diplomats have accepted the need to call on non-career diplomats and work well with them. Today, the Foreign Ministry has a pool of Non-Resident Ambassadors, most of them non-diplomats, and Honorary Consuls-General, who augment MFA's talent pool and play a significant role in furthering Singapore's interest overseas.

My Beginnings

12 I entered the Foreign Ministry without any diplomatic training. On joining in December 1965, there was Mr Francis D'Costa, he was there to set up the ministry, and I asked the late Mr Rajaratnam what I was expected to do. He said, "Don't worry, it will come naturally." Indeed, it did. It took me some months to get an inkling of what I was there to do. With that little knowledge, I embarked on what was to be an exciting stint in the Foreign Ministry. Initially, it lasted till 1971 and later, over three years from 1979 to 1982.

13 It was an exhilarating experience for me to be present when the early history of independent Singapore was being made. Sitting in on conversations that the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defence Minister engaged with their foreign counterparts, diplomats and distinguished journalists, I felt that I too was participating in the making of foreign policy and important security decisions. Having suddenly been cut adrift in a turbulent region, Singapore faced many uncertainties - political, economic, security and the big question of whether it could survive. In being close to our political leaders, I understood what pre-occupied them each day.

Learning on the Job

14 The years immediately following our independence were also times of ignorance about diplomacy. Without deep knowledge of international affairs, let alone diplomacy and representational practices, we undertook the tasks of desk officers dealing with political and economic questions in the Foreign Ministry, flying blind, you could say.

15 On occasion, when officials from other ministries visited the Foreign Ministry and found our officers reading newspapers, they would conclude wrongly that MFA officers were skiving. What they did not understand was that with only two overseas missions at that point, reading newspapers was a vital way for MFA officers to get information and monitor international developments. Of course, things are very different today. All ministries, not just MFA, are engaging in foreign affairs and reading newspapers has become part of their daily routine.

16 Questions about opening up diplomatic missions abroad were often raised with us by foreign diplomats. We were urged to give priority to their capitals on grounds of special relationships they claimed with Singapore. We were able to fob off such urgings, explaining that the decision lay with the Prime Minister's Office. There were also pressures on us to state Singapore's stand on various foreign policy or security issues that were being debated in the UN and other international fora. But with little or no background information, it was difficult to take positions. This disappointed many of our interlocutors and there was little appreciation of the unique circumstances that had made us a state conducting diplomacy without any institutional memory about international issues.

17 Many from the Commonwealth missions of the United Kingdom, India, Australia and New Zealand did much to be helpful to us. They laid out for us the elements in the controversial issues of the times that needed to be taken into account in arriving at a policy response. No doubt their assistance also had a subtle tilt in their advice on what stand I should take and which particular issues merited my attention. Nonetheless, they showed us the ropes regarding the traditional functions performed by the Foreign Ministry and the various processes of diplomatic communications and engagements. They provided us much-needed background information about important issues before the UN and its agencies, and developments in the Afro-Asian countries and Non-Aligned Movement as and when we needed, but we did not have enough officers to absorb and act on them.

18 This inadequacy of experience also showed itself when the Ministry was called upon in the immediate months after independence to receive foreign dignitaries on official visits. Our colleagues in the protocol section insisted that proper protocol treatment should be accorded to all, without distinction of their importance. I remember one instance when we had to receive the Vice-President of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as Special Envoy of President Kim Il Sung. It was decided to accord the visitor all the courtesies of a Head of State, as he came with the rank of Special Envoy of the "Great Leader" and Vice-President of the DPRK. We gave him gun salutes, Guard-of-Honour and all the frills of a State Visit. It was only many years later that we learnt that every such Presidential Envoy was given the status of Vice-President for the occasion of his mission. In fact, there were some 30 to 40 Vice-Presidents in the country. After that first experience, we became wise to the dictum that protocol was our servant, not our master, and its arcane rules were for us to determine.

The Initial Years

19 In the initial years, the Foreign Ministry was focused on providing back-up services to our political leaders. Whether it be about political, economic or defence and security related diplomacy, it was our three principal leaders - Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Foreign Minister Rajaratnam and Defence Minister Dr Goh Keng Swee - who took the lead.

20 Our immediate priority was to consolidate Singapore's independence and sovereignty by seeking the widest possible international recognition, which the United Nations and its agencies quickly afforded us. Immediately after Singapore's admission to the United Nations on 21 September 1965, then DPM Dr Toh Chin Chye, Foreign Minister Rajaratnam and a small delegation, which included Mr Herman Hochstadt, embarked on an extensive two-month tour of Africa, Europe and Asia to explain the circumstances of our independence and project the new image of Singapore as an independent country and not just a city.

21 Fortunately, since Singapore's leaders had already begun to reach out to the world during the years of self-government starting from 1959, they were known to leaders, particularly in the Commonwealth and Asia. Then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Mr Rajaratnam had been travelling and attending regional and international gatherings to make foreign leaders conscious of Singapore's anti-colonial struggle. Then Prime Minister Lee had developed personal relations not just with British and Asian leaders but was friendly with such luminaries as Soekarno, Nehru, Nasser, Sihanouk and other Afro-Asian freedom fighters.

22 The friendships our leaders enjoyed with their counterparts overseas helped to prevent, on Singapore's independence, any pre-emptive neo-colonialist moves to return us to colonial status. It was also why, on independence, we had sought quick recognition from the Afro-Asian group of countries to whom colonialism was anathema. At a time when we had no armed forces of our own, our concern was with how not to be squeezed by forces near and far. The bonds of friendship that were established pre-independence stood us in good stead. It gave Singapore elbow room and helped to prevent us from becoming isolated in a then turbulent region.

23 Beginning in 1966, having already established missions in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta, the Ministry went about selectively establishing diplomatic missions in key countries which were politically or economically important to Singapore. Beyond individual countries, our Permanent Representation to the United Nations facilitated the establishment of contacts with leaders of other member states, members of various regional and international organisations, and the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Expanding Role of the Foreign Ministry

24 The other priority task was to ensure Singapore's growth through economic development. The Finance Ministry, Economic Development Board (EDB) and then Department of Trade were the prime movers of our economic diplomacy. Then Prime Minister Lee himself was most active in the promotion of investments from abroad, once the ground had been prepared by EDB officers. Our Cabinet Ministers also made it a point to meet businessmen during their overseas visits to sell Singapore.

25 In those early years, the Foreign Ministry played a secondary role supporting the economic agencies in their investment promotion work. In 1967, the Foreign Ministry led by Mr Rajaratnam took an active part in the establishment of ASEAN, giving it an overt economic focus, with the unspoken political purpose of gaining strength through solidarity in anticipation of the unwinding of the Vietnam War and a communist victory there.

26 In February 1976, the first ASEAN Summit was convened in Bali. The most significant outcome was the Declaration of ASEAN Concord or Bali Declaration. It was a comprehensive ASEAN response to the new security environment in Southeast Asia following the communist takeover in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in 1975. The emergence of ASEAN as a diplomatic community was seen in the conclusion of the "Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia" (TAC) at the Summit.

27 Although economic cooperation occupied the longest section of the Bali Declaration, significant ASEAN economic co-operation did not occur as some member countries were still focused on import substitution and were concerned about their lack of competitiveness if intra-ASEAN markets were liberalised. But the Bali Summit was significant for the introduction of the concept of "preferential trading arrangements" (PTA) to facilitate the expansion of trade among ASEAN countries. This PTA laid the foundation for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), and the subsequent move towards the ASEAN Economic Community. The target date for the ASEAN Economic Community is now set for 2015 and when realised, the whole of ASEAN will be integrated into a single market and production base.

28 In the early years of our economic diplomacy, each ministry was focused on promoting its own interests. Over time, however, the Ministry of Finance and other economic agencies began working closely with the Foreign Ministry and its overseas missions. The economic role of the Foreign Ministry thus expanded over time, leading to campaigns to oppose challenges and protectionist measures which could hurt our trade, shipping or air services. For example, in 1978, Australia announced its new International Civil Aviation Policy (ICAP) which would impact the tourist and airline businesses of ASEAN countries. The Foreign Ministry, with the support of our economic agencies, took the lead to mobilise the support of all ASEAN countries and the Group of 77 to mount a vigorous offensive against ICAP until the issue was resolved amicably in 1981. The Ministry also led the campaign to delay Singapore's graduation from the developed countries' Generalised System of Preference (GSP) benefits and took the lead in multilateral trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Resort to Quiet Diplomacy and Defence Diplomacy

29 Within a few years of the Foreign Ministry's establishment, situations arose calling for both the prevention and the management of crises that developed in our relations with countries in the region. Closer interaction with our neighbours also alerted us to the varying power centres that asserted influence in each country in their conduct of foreign relations. Singapore had to move beyond the traditional practices of diplomacy and resort to quiet diplomacy and defence diplomacy with such power centres, without affecting inter-foreign ministry ties.

30 The first instance where we found it necessary to resort to quiet diplomacy was in dealing with the fallout from the hanging of two Indonesian marine commandos (Korps Komando or KKOs) who had planted a bomb at MacDonald House, killing three and injuring 33 in 1965. Efforts were made by both countries to ensure that no rupture in relations followed. Quiet diplomacy also helped in the management of the hijack of the "Laju" vessel by terrorists from the Japanese Red Army and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1974. In the immediate years following independence, without a clearly demarcated boundary along the Straits of Singapore, cross-border transgressions by various Indonesian naval, police and customs vessels were common. It was through quiet diplomacy that agreement was reached between the two countries on the demarcated boundary in the waters of the Straits of Singapore that is now in place.

31 In a crisis, timely establishment of a channel for quiet discussion to be followed by action to resolve the matter is critical. Quiet diplomacy allowed us the opportunity to quietly test out each other's positions and provided ways to identify preliminary concessions that could be offered without being bound by them. Sometimes it made it easier to even quietly solicit the use of third party channels, when negotiations reached an impasse or breaking point. Resort to quiet diplomacy allowed Singapore to carry out dispassionate dialogue and negotiations without being pressured by the curiosity of non-participants and away from the glare of the media.

32 As the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) was being built up, it was natural to expect suspicions among neighbouring armed forces, with whom Singapore had no previous contact. We had to build confidence through contacts and exchanges. As leading military personalities were then dominating the power centres in some of our neighbouring countries, it became imperative that links be built with them.

33 Through defence diplomacy, Singapore could build confidence and mutual trust with the neighbouring armed forces and their key personalities. In several cases, as mutual trust increased, we also secured training facilities in their countries. Today, what began as defence diplomacy in the infancy of our diplomatic history has become the basis for more comprehensive military relations with our neighbours and beyond.

Multilateral Diplomacy

34 Another important aspect of our early diplomatic history is multilateral diplomacy.

35 As a small state, Singapore recognises the importance of a stable and open international order; hence, we have played an active multilateral role. From 1972, when it became apparent that a new legal order for the law of the sea was going to be developed, Singapore took an active role to shepherd a regime that preserved navigational freedom, especially the passage rights through international waterways like the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

36 DPM Professor Jayakumar, Attorney-General Chao Hick Tin and Professor Tommy Koh played key roles on this. We pushed through a resolution calling on the UN Secretariat to undertake a study that would shatter the myth that extensive national maritime jurisdictions benefited all developing nations. This led to the emergence of a new interest-based caucus of "landlocked and geographically disadvantaged" states, which went on to become a key player in the negotiations on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

37 Given Singapore's proactive role and his diplomatic skills, Professor Tommy Koh was asked to take over the Presidency of the UN Conference. This put Singapore in an ideal position to broker compromises in a package that balanced the interest of coastal states with the community interest of the maritime nations.

Fundamentals of Our Foreign Policy

38 Let me now touch on the fundamentals of Singapore's foreign policy.

39 As with most other countries, geopolitical circumstances played a big role in the formulation of our foreign policy. The circumstances under which we gained independence underscored our inherent vulnerability. As a newly-independent small country located in a then politically volatile region, our foreign policy, made on the run, was directed at coping with this vulnerability. In the initial years, much of our attention was focused on managing relations with Malaysia, with whom we were newly separated, and restoring ties with Indonesia, in the aftermath of Konfrontasi. Given their importance, relations with these countries were handled at the highest political level.

40 We sought good and stable relations with both Malaysia and Indonesia for the long term. But the fact remained that Singapore and our neighbours were organised differently. We sought to ensure that bilateral relations with Malaysia and Indonesia were conducted on the basis of mutual respect, mutual benefit and sovereign equality. But even as we sought to accommodate each other, we held to our principles and our rights as an independent country.

41 This was why we stood firm on the death sentence of the two marines, despite appeals from the highest office and threats of reprisal. Their hanging sparked off street protests in Jakarta and the Singapore Embassy was torched.

42 It was also for the same reason that we took a firm stand on the caning of Michael Fay in 1994, despite the appeal from the US President and the impact on our bilateral relations with the US. I was then our Ambassador to Washington. There was a huge media storm in the US but we stood firm in the face of heat, while remaining calm and rational. After careful deliberation, the Singapore government decided to reduce the number of strokes from six to four. The Administration was not satisfied and thereafter we had to spend time and effort to repair the damages to our bilateral relations. But at the end of his second term, President Bill Clinton took the historic decision to begin Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with Singapore.

43 Beyond fostering relations with our immediate neighbours on the basis of mutual benefit and mutual respect, we also sought to create and secure for Singapore external political, diplomatic and economic space. We reached out to the developed countries, particularly the US, Europe and Japan. As a small state in a dangerous and uncertain world, we have also seen it in our interest to wrap ourselves in something larger, whether it is ASEAN, the UN or international legal regimes.

44 We worked to keep the regional architecture open and welcomed the constructive engagement of major powers. Mr Rajaratnam famously described this in a speech to the Asia Society in New York in 1973, "Like the sun the great powers will, by their very existence, radiate gravitational power. But if there are many suns then the smaller planets can, by judicious balancing of pulls and counter-pulls, enjoy a greater freedom of movement...".

45 Through the decades, Singapore consistently insisted on and entrenched the principle of "open regionalism" as an intrinsic and vital part of the definition of regional doctrines. We also worked with like-minded countries to create networks to enhance the region's openness, while maintaining ASEAN's diplomatic centrality.

46 Another approach which characterised Singapore's foreign policy was our pragmatism. As a small country, Singapore took a realistic view of its limitations and constraints. We knew very well that we had very little influence over our external environment, immediate and beyond. We dealt with the business of foreign relations without sentiment, ideology or illusion. Pragmatism is not the abjuration of idealism or the pursuit of idealistic goals but a necessary condition in international relations, particularly for small states. We had to focus our limited resources and energies in areas which mattered.

47 To recognise limitations is not to be passive. Between what actually exists and what must ultimately be accepted lies a margin of possibilities. We have always taken a pragmatic and focused attitude and have been able at times to transcend our smallness and limits, and made an impact far exceeding our size. Hence, we remained alert, analysed situations clinically and remained flexible and nimble.

48 Our pragmatic approach can be seen in the way we dealt with China and Taiwan. In 1967, in order to overcome our lack of training space and not to be completely dependent on the Israelis for assistance in the training of our military, we started discussions with the Taiwanese for use of their training areas. When Taiwan set up its trade office in Singapore two years later, we insisted that this exchange of trade missions did not entail formal diplomatic recognition of each other. That has remained our policy since. We adhered to our "One-China" policy and never established formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, even though relations have continued to be friendly and mutually beneficial in the defence, economic and people-to-people areas.

49 Another fundamental of Singapore's foreign policy was our non-alignment. On Singapore's assumption of UN membership in September 1965, Mr Rajaratnam explained Singapore's position in these words, and I quote, "this does not mean that Singapore equates non-alignment with indifference to basic issues of right and wrong or that it will evade taking a stand on matters which it considers vital lest it displeases some member nations, including those with which it has close ties." He reminded us that support for particular international developments with political or security overtones could lead to the end of our independence. At the same time, we could not afford to keep our heads low for fear of offending the big powers but had to make a stand when our interests were affected. This is what we have maintained since.

50 Let me cite two instances where we had to make a stand even though we were a new player on the block. At ASEAN's founding, Singapore defended its right to have the presence of British and Australian forces and the naval base in Singapore. The Preamble to the draft ASEAN Declaration that was for discussion by the Foreign Ministers included a stipulation which in summary opposed the presence of foreign bases and referred to these bases not being used to subvert the national independence of member countries or serve the particular interest of any of the big powers.

51 At the inaugural Bangkok meeting, Singapore stood firmly against such a provision, even though others were prepared to live with such a Preamble. Today, that provision as enshrined in the ASEAN Declaration states that all foreign bases "remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned". We had argued successfully that Singapore and Malaysia were fighting a foreign-assisted communist insurgency and such defence support was critical. As I was at the founding and took part in the redrafting of that Preamble, I speak from personal knowledge of our stand and the resultant change.

52 In the late-1970s, Singapore made another stand. Despite our abhorrence of the tragedy heaped on the Cambodian people by the brutality of the Khmer Rouge regime, Singapore strongly contested the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. This was a clear case of violation of international borders and an act of external aggression, which would have established an undesirable principle of international relations if left unopposed. Together with other ASEAN delegations, for a decade, Singapore diplomats helped lead the challenge to the position of Vietnam and its allies both in regional and international fora. Many of our current career ambassadors like Kishore Mahbubani, Tony Siddique and Tommy Koh cut their teeth and learnt their trade during this period. In the Non-Aligned Movement and in the UN General Assembly, our stand and that of our ASEAN colleagues enabled us to move the matter to the "Paris Talks" and helped in the restoration of Cambodia's independence.

53 In both these instances, Singapore showed its determination not to remain passive for fear of offending others. While others expected us, as a small state, to recognise our vulnerability and adopt a passive approach in our foreign relations so as to avoid retaliation, we chose to make a stand when our interests were at stake.

Trends in a Complex and Changing World

54 Today, international relations are becoming more complex. The practice of foreign policy is also changing. But what remains permanent is the fact that, as a small state, we cannot ignore the dangers we face to our sovereignty and territorial integrity. History is littered with examples of small states which have succumbed after brief lifetimes. Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Kuwait in 1990 are reminders that as a small state, we cannot take our existence for granted.

55 For a small state like Singapore, it is critical to have a clear and clinical assessment of the world - seeing the world as it is and not as we hope or think it ought to be. Having an accurate understanding of the evolving geo-strategic picture will enable us to position ourselves appropriately and respond swiftly to changes.

56 I believe that four key trends will drive global developments and international relations in the coming years.

57 First, globalisation. There is now a more intricate matrix of great power relations, fuelled by growing economic interdependence. The technology that drives globalisation is also compressing space, accelerating time and broadening the scope of international change in historically unprecedented ways.

58 The second major trend is the evolving strategic framework in Asia. For the foreseeable future, the US will remain the most influential global actor. But Asia is on a growth trajectory, lifted by the re-emergence of China and India. This will lead to strategic realignments determined by the complex and interdependent relationships between the US, China, Japan and India.

59 Against this shifting and dynamic backdrop, ASEAN countries have decided to accelerate and deepen integration. The ASEAN Charter will fundamentally transform the organisation and the entire region over the long term.

60 Third, global terrorism will remain a major threat to international security. September 11 brought to the surface the virulent threat of global terrorism, driven by an extremist religious ideology. Governments around the world have made some progress but the threat remains. Terrorism must be fought with both ideas and armies. This ideological struggle is far more complex than the struggle against communism because it engages not just reason but religious faith.

61 Fourth, non-traditional security challenges like climate change, environmental degradation and competition for resources are coming to the fore of the international agenda. The effects of climate change and environmental degradation will place even greater importance on the effective management of scarce resources like energy and water. The rising competition for energy resources could also alter the geo-strategic landscape as energy security comes to the forefront of national agendas.

Relevance of Diplomacy for Singapore in Today's World

62 Some analysts have argued that in a world where the nature of international relations is being fundamentally transformed, diplomacy has lost its relevance. Today, leaders meet frequently and deal directly with the business of foreign policy. The conventional role of diplomats sending dispatches on political and economic developments in their host country is becoming less useful given the Internet and media networks.

63 Diplomacy is indeed being conducted in new ways and it must balance new, complex and diverse interests. But it is an extravagant claim that diplomacy has lost its relevance. We must continue to adapt the practice of diplomacy and find ways to create value. This is the challenge for foreign services all over the world, not just for Singapore.

64 Public diplomacy, for instance, has become important. With increased global interdependence, multilateral diplomacy too has gained in importance. A country's foreign policy agenda is being shaped by international institutions and norms, the media and civil society. As recent financial crises have shown, problems in one part of the world could spread very quickly. Economic and financial issues will increasingly occupy a large part of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

Qualities Needed to be a Successful Diplomat

65 Given the challenges that diplomats have to face, let me say a few words about some of the qualities needed to be a successful diplomat, and the role I envisage for the MFA Diplomatic Academy.

66 None of our founding ambassadors had formal diplomatic training. But they displayed skills and were street smart - qualities which our Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) must imbibe.

67 Personal attributes like patience, calm, modesty, empathy and good humour as well as interpersonal skills are important because fundamentally, diplomacy is about human relations. Diplomats must also be curious about the people, places and cultures they cover. But beyond these, for our FSOs to succeed, they must have the following qualities:
i. Patriotism and Sense of Mission
ii. Networking and Negotiation Skills
iii. Integrity and Honesty
iv. Adaptability and Spirit of Adventure
v. Ability to Work Under Pressure
vi. Entrepreneurial mindset
vii. Good Management Skills
viii. Ability to Work as a Team in MFA and as Whole-of- Government

68 To do their jobs effectively, our diplomats must have an accurate understanding of Singapore's core interests. Big states can occasionally tilt at windmills. Small states have no such luxury as chasing after mirages is a dangerous and wasteful pursuit. Increasingly, many of our domestic strategies and policies have an international dimension. FSOs must not only understand our domestic priorities but develop competencies in new areas like energy security and climate change, even though these are under the responsibility of other ministries in Singapore. In this way, they can help advance Singapore's overall interests internationally.

69 Our FSOs should also be mindful that diplomacy is not just about being nice. Diplomatic niceties are means to an end. FSOs should not confuse means and ends. Often, other countries will attempt to cajole us through appeals and urge us to take into account "special relationships" and "historical links". Many will couch their efforts to advance their national agendas in high sounding principles and moralistic terms. We should not be beguiled. The objective of every diplomat must be to advance and defend the national interests of the country he or she represents. We need not be shy about defending ourselves.

70 Diplomatic spouses play a significant role in the success of FSOs. Like the spouses of our founding ambassadors, many MFA spouses continue to make personal and career sacrifices. The nomadic lifestyle of diplomats places huge demands and stress on their spouses and families. I would like to recognise the role of MFA spouses and express my thanks to them for their sacrifices and contributions.

Role of MFA Diplomatic Academy

71 Turning to the role of the MFA Diplomatic Academy, I envisage at least three aspects.

72 First, one of the Diplomatic Academy's key roles will be to give form to our focus on nurturing the key asset of the Foreign Ministry - its people. It is about how to systematically extract lessons learnt and experiences accumulated by the first and second generations of diplomats and transmit them to successive generations.

73 Second, the Academy's usefulness goes beyond that of training MFA officers. It should help to sensitise all public sector officials to international developments. Today, international relations impinge on all aspects of our domestic situation and policies. While the Foreign Ministry provides domestic ministries with advice and guidance on how to navigate the field of international relations, domestic ministries must take the lead and engage with external issues and international organisations. The role of the Academy therefore dovetails with the World.Singapore framework of the public service, which aims to create a mindset in our public officers to think and act globally, and to see the world as opportunity.

74 Third, the Academy could eventually serve as the focal point of sharing diplomatic experience and best practices between Singaporean diplomats and diplomats from other nations, especially from the Asian region. Its future role could expand into becoming a training centre for diplomats from the region and internationally, rather than just for Singaporean diplomats.

Conclusion

75 Let me conclude. Mr Rajaratnam, after whom this lecture series is named, has left for us both in his speeches and policies, the basic tenets of Singapore's foreign policy. They have served us well for over four decades and stood the test of time. The Foreign Ministry itself has come a long way from its humble beginnings when we had independence thrust upon us, building from scratch and surviving on improvisations.

76 But it would be a serious mistake to believe that we have already "arrived" or indeed, ever can, "arrive". This is a journey with no end; a constant process of adaptation and striving for new capabilities to deal with new challenges. I know that the Ministry understands this and so I am confident of its future and I am proud to have played a part in its beginnings.

77 For more than 40 years, the men and women of MFA have served their country with dedication and distinction. What has kept MFA going has been a clear focus on creating and securing Singapore's external space. We must have a good foreign service, agile and nimble, working in concert with the whole-of-government, so that Singapore continues to respond adroitly to the ever-changing world. Only then can Singapore's survival, growth and continued success be assured.

78 On that note, and in memory of the late Mr Rajaratnam, I am pleased to launch the MFA Diplomatic Academy and wish it every success in its Mission.

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